The so-called Republic of Abkhazia claimed to have invited 67 “international observers” to monitor the first round and 12 “international observers” to monitor the second round of the “presidential elections” that were not recognised as legitimate by the international community. The people they invited to observe the “elections” can be divided into three groups: (1) official representatives of the countries that recognise their sovereignty and independence, (2) representatives of the pseudo-states largely controlled by Russia, and (3) foreign individuals known for their previous involvement in various pro-Kremlin efforts and coming mostly from far-right parties, organisations and movements.

The Russian organisation National Social Monitoring coordinated by Roman Kolomoytsev invited 10 foreign individuals to observe elections of different levels in several Russian regions. None of these individuals was accredited by Russia’s Central Election Commission as an election observer; rather, they were referred to as international or election experts.

Cambodia’s National Election Committee accredited a “senior delegation of the international observers” consisting predominantly of around 30 European and American politicians. This mission was directly coordinated by several Russian actors, including Aleksey Chepa, deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, and Oleg Bondarenko, Director of the Foundation for Progressive Policy.

The so-called Lugansk People’s Republic claimed to have invited 45 “international observers” to monitor the “elections” that were not recognised as legitimate by the international community. Out of the identified individuals, around half of them were politicians and state officials. Other “observers” were predominantly businessmen, students, journalists, and far-right and far-left activists and conspiracy theorists.

The so-called Republic of South Ossetia claimed to have invited 50-70 “international observers” to monitor the “elections” that were not recognised as legitimate by the international community. The people they invited to observe the “elections” can be divided into three groups: (1) official representatives of the countries that recognise their sovereignty and independence, (2) representatives of the pseudo-states largely controlled by Russia, and (3) foreign individuals known for their previous involvement in various pro-Kremlin efforts and coming mostly from far-right parties, organisations and movements.

The European Council on Democracy and Human Rights (ECDHR) international observation mission featured 18 European politicians and was headed by Janusz Niedźwiecki, a member of a Polish far-right party “Change”.

In order to have a possibility to stay in power until 2036, Russian President Vladimir Putin decided, in January 2020, to change the Constitution of the Russian Federation and legitimise its change through the “all-Russian voting”.

A new legal framework for the vote was created, which became officially known as “the all-Russian voting on amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation”.

Russia’s Central Election Committee did not invite any official international observers from established organisations such as the OSCE ODIHR or PACE, because international observation is envisioned only by Russian federal laws

on parliamentary and presidential elections, while international observation was not included in the legal framework of the “all-Russian voting”. However, as the Russian authority had done before, they invited – through the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation – 75 foreign individuals who would officially be called “international experts” and be ready to praise any electoral process in Russia as democratic, open, free and fair. Russian authorities never published a list of the “international experts” they invited to “observe” the voting process, but we have identified 52 such individuals using OSINT methods (9 in annexed Crimea, 43 in Russia).

Using the COVID-19 pandemic as a pretext, Russia imposed limitations on the election observation mission by the most respectable and influential monitoring institution, OSCE ODIHR. The OSCE assessed that it would need to deploy 80 long-term and 420 short-term observers in Russia, but Moscow would invite only 60 OSCE observers. Eventually, the OSCE was compelled not so send its observers to Russia. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) did not send a regular election observation mission either, but it did send an Election Assessment Mission composed of five representatives of all five political groups in the Council of Europe.

Against this background, Russian authorities felt they needed loyal and uncritical international election observation for the parliamentary elections on 17-19 September 2021 even to a greater extent than before. In an attempt to give the impression of international legitimation of the parliamentary elections, Russian authorities reportedly brought in 383 “international observers” and “experts” from 80 countries. Russia’s Central Election Commission (CEC) was in charge of accrediting 245 “international observers” from 59 countries invited by the Russian parliament – they were largely representatives from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy, Parliamentary Assembly of Belarus-Russia Union and some others. These international organisations and institutions never voice criticism of the elections conducted by Putin’s regime.

The election monitoring mission “Political Initiative” organised by Sergejs Blagoveščenskis and Janusz Niedźwiecki to observe the 2015 regional elections in Ukraine

In anticipation of the OSCE ODIHR mission’s criticism of the Hungarian parliamentary elections, the Hungarian authorities decided that they needed to counterbalance the expected OSCE’s criticism with positive assessments of the elections. To this end, and for the first time in the history of any EU Member State, Orbán’s government invited dozens of friendly politicians, journalists, and civil society activists whose aim was to endorse the elections. These friendly observers – among them members of the European Parliament and of the PACE of the Council of Europe - praised the conduct of the parliamentary elections in Hungary and made clearly political statements in support of Fidesz and Orbán.

From 23 to 27 September 2022, the Russian forces organised a sham election process - a pseudo-referendum as a pretext for the formal annexation of the regions of occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson by Russia. The annexation of the four regions was announced on 30 September 2022. Dozens of international individual observers were identified as participants in this pseudo-referendum.

From 23 to 27 September 2022, the Russian forces organised a sham election process - a pseudo-referendum as a pretext for the formal annexation of the regions of occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson by Russia. The annexation of the four regions was announced on 30 September 2022. Dozens of international individual observers were identified as participants in this pseudo-referendum.